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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to this rule requires that the lack of knowledge must be without
negligence or fault of the party seeking to be excused.6 Applying
the general rule to this case, it would appear that the case should
have gone to the jury, in order to determine whether the plaintiff
was negligent in failing to discover the policy.
Section 164, subdivision 3(n)14, of the New York Insurance
Law provides that no action shall be maintained on a policy unless
brought within two years from the expiration of the time within
which proof of loss is required by the policy. Whether ignorance
as to the existence of the policy will excuse the beneficiary from
filing proofs of loss within ninety days after the date of the loss, as
required by Section 164, subdivision 3(g)7, of the New York In-
surance Law, is a question that has not as yet been squarely met
in the New York courts. It has been held that although the ten- or
twenty-day period after the accident, within which notice must be
given, 6 may be extended by necessity (the notice may be given as
soon as reasonably possible) 7 the period within which proof of loss
must be filed may not be extended. The filing of the proof of loss
ithin that period is an absolute condition precedent to the plaintiff's
right to recover on the policy, unless the policy expressly states that
such failure to comply will be excused if shown to be not reasonably
possible."
In the case at hand, since the insurance contract did not adopt
this language which would overcome the strictness of the rule, the
period within which proof of loss should have been filed was not
extended. It terminated ninety days after the loss, at which time
the two-year period of limitation commenced to run, and having run
out, the plaintiff is barred from bringing an action. W. C. B.
LANDLORD AND TENANT - CONSTRUCTIVE EvIcTION. - The
premises involved, an apartment in a multiple dwelling unit, were
extensively damaged by a fire. The landlord in this action seeks to
(1897); McElroy v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 88 Md. 137, 41 Atl. 112(1898); Munz v. Standard Life and Accident Ins. Co., 26 Utah 69, 72 Pac.
182 (1903).5 Schanzenback v. American Life Ins. Co., 58 S. D. 528, 237 N. W. 737
(1931).8 N. Y. INSuRANcE LAW § 164, subds. 3(d), 4.
7 Walterman v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Assn., 260 App. Div.
478, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 158 (1st Dep't 1940); MacKay v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 281 N. Y. 42, 46, 22 N. E. (2d) 154, 156 (1939).
8 Trieger v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Assn., 122 Misc. 159,
202 N. Y. Supp. 410 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ; see Titus v. Travelers Ins. Co., 268 App.
Div. 802, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 203 (2d Dep't 1944); Trippe v. P. F. Society, 140
N. Y. 23, 35 N. E. 316 (1893).
[ VOL. 21
RECENT DECISIONS
enforce payment of the rent for the two months subsequent to the
fire. The defendant tenant remained in possession and occupancy of
the premises. Due to the unrepaired fire damage his use and occu-
pation was limited to a portion of the premises. The tenant, appear-
ing in his own behalf, interposed a counterclaim for property damage.
The counterclaim was dismissed without prejudice and, on the trial,
the tenant was permitted to assert as an offset or defense a claim of
constructive eviction. Held, judgm ent granted to plaintiff landlord
for the rent with an abatement for the diminished facilities and ser-
vices given the tenant. Majen Realty Corp. v. Glotzer, - Misc. -,
61 N. Y. S. (2d) 195 (Mun. Ct. 1946).
At the common law the destruction of a building or other part
of leasehold premises by fire had no effect upon the tenant's obliga-
tion to pay the rent reserved.' The common law rule on this point
has been changed by statute in New York and in many other juris-
dictions. The New York statute provides that when a leased building
is destroyed or so injured by the elements, or any other cause, as
to be untenantable and unfit for occupancy, and no express agree-
ment to the contrary has been made in writing, the lessee may, if
the destruction or injury occurred without his fault or neglect, sur-
render the premises to the landlord and be free from liability for the
rent subsequent to the surrender.2
The requisite of actual abandonment has long been held as in-
dispensable to the sufficiency of a defense of constructive eviction.3
This requirement stems from the very nature of the claim. The
tenant, in setting up a defense of constructive eviction, says, in effect,
that some act or omission of the landlord has so affected his use and
enjoyment of the premises as to render them untenantable. The
bare fact of retention and continued occupancy, however, unequivo-
cally belies the contention that the premises were rendered unin-
habitable. The court readily conceded the soundness and vigor of
the general rule which requires actual abandonment for a defense of
constructive eviction. Taking judicial notice of the critical housing
situation, however, it declared that the rule was subject to relaxa-
tion when, as here, the tenant's retention of the premises could be
explained on the basis of the impossibility of obtaining living quarters
elsewhere in the event of surrender. Thus the court concluded that
continuance of possession and occupancy in this particular case did
not belie the claim that the premises were untenantable. Having
established the sufficiency of the defense of constructive eviction, not-
withstanding the want of the element of actual abandonment, the
1 See Kingsbury v. Westfall, 61 N. Y. 356 (1875) ; WALsH, THF LAW OF
PROPERTY (2d ed., 1927).
2 N. Y. REAL PRoPERT'Y LAW § 227.
3 Two Rector Street Corporation v. Bien, 226 App. Div. 73, 234 N. Y.
Supp. 409 (1st Dep't 1929) ; Boreel v. Lawton, 90 N. Y. 293 (1882) ; Edgerton
v. Page, 20 N. Y. 281 (1850).
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court then reflected that, in the case at hand, the tenant's defense
would be valid in the absence of the inclination on its part to permit
waiver of the requirements of the general rule in regard to construc-
tive eviction. In support of this contention the court advances the
theory that a tenant need not allege abandonment of premises and is
not required to pay rent, even for the part he retains and uses when
he has been constructively evicted from the other part. Two cases
are cited as representing authority for this rule.4 It is submitted
that the cases referred to as authority do not sustain the theory ad-
vanced by the court. The cases relied upon by the court concededly
do establish that a tenant shall not be required to pay rent for even
the part he retains when he has been evicted from the other part.
However, the authority for the rule emphatically points out that a
partial eviction to work a relieving of the rent obligation in favor of
the tenant must be actual partial eviction as distinguished from a
constructive partial eviction. The partial eviction relied upon in the
instant case is based on the landlord's negligence. By statute in New
York, the landlord is burdened with the duty of keeping the prem-
ises in good repair.5 His failure to repair within a reasonable time
after the fire denied the tenant the use and enjoyment of a part of
the premises and consequently, as to that portion, constituted an
eviction. The circumstances of the eviction, however, unmistakably
stamp it as constructive in nature. Walsh, in his text on Real
Property, states that "cases of so-called constructive eviction arise
where the tenant is forced to quit the premises because of a wrongful
act of the landlord's such as the maintenance of a nuisance on an
adjoining property, or the breach of some duty owed by the landlord
to the tenant which so interferes with his possession as to force him,
acting as a reasonable man, to move from the premises." 6
Since it appears that the court was in error in regard to its
theory that a constructive eviction from a portion of the premises
will permit a tenant to retain the remainder and pay a proportionate
part of the rent, it follows that the tenant's defense in the case at
hand could be sustained only by the relaxation of the general rule
as originally contemplated by the court. Even if it were to be con-
ceded that the court considered the partial eviction to be actual rather
than constructive, it is submitted that the judgment rendered on
those conclusions would in itself be contrary to authority. It was
expressly decided in one of the cases the court relies upon that where
there has been a partial eviction (actual), basic rules of law demand
that the tenant be held wholly free of the obligation to pay rent from
the time of the partial eviction to the time of the restoration of the
4 City of New York v. Pike Realty Corp., 247 N. Y. 245, 160 N. E. 359
(1928) ; Christopher v. Austin, 11 N. Y. 216 (1854).
5 N. Y. MuTimPLE DWELLING LAW §§ 78, 80.6 WALSH, THE LAW OF PROPERTY (2d ed. 1927) § 188-a; cf. Tallman v.
Murphy, 120 N. Y. 345, 24 N. E. 716 (1890).
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premises. 7 The underlying reason for this rule has been explained
as being that the landlord's denial of the use and enjoyment of a
part of the premises is a wrongful act and, since the law will not
permit a wrongdoer to apportion his own wrong, the tenant will not
be held liable even for that portion of the premises retained and
occupied.8 The judgment here does violence to that principle by
determining the value of that portion of the premises which were de-
nied to the tenant, subtracting it from the total rent, and awarding
the remainder to the landlord. In effect the judgment permits the
landlord to recover on a quantum meruit basis even though, because
of his wrongful act, the law precludes a recovery on the agreement
itself.
It is submitted that the law of this state as interpreted by the
higher tribunals is contra to the rule of decision herein. No criti-
cism is offered as to the actual result reached by the court. The
judgment is no doubt a fair adjustment of the differences between
the parties and may be classified under the heading of practical jus-
tice. The query is directed rather at the means employed to serve
that end. The Pike ' case clearly settles the rule of decision appli-
cable to a case wherein the tenant has been constructively evicted
from a portion of the premises by a wrongful act of the landlord.
It establishes that, in such a case, the tenant must pay the rent re-
served, and seek damages for that portion of the premises, the use
and enjoyment of which was denied to him by the landlord's wrong-
ful act or omission by interposition of a counterclaim based upon a
breach of either express or implied covenants of quiet enjoyment
contained in the lease.
P. S. C., JR.
LIFE INSURANcE-RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARY-SURRENDER OF
POLICY FOR CASH VALUE BY INCOMPETENT INSURED.-On May 13,
1944, the insured changed the beneficiary in accordance with the right
reserved in each policy and substituted his own estate for the plain-
tiff, his widow, as beneficiary. On May 15, 1944, he surrendered the
policies in accordance with the provisions thereof, and received a full
cash surrender value. On May 13, and May 15, 1944 and there-
after until his death, the insured was insane and lacked mental
capacity to perform any legal act. Defendant had no notice of in-
7 City of New York v. Pike Realty Corp., 247 N. Y. 245, 160 N. E. 359(1928).8 Two Rector Street Corporation v. Bien, 226 App. Div. 73, 234 N. Y.
Supp. 409 (1st Dep't 1929); Fifth Avenue Building Co. v. Kernochan, 221
N. Y. 370, 117 N. E. 579 (1917).
9 City of New York v. Pike Realty Corp., 247 N. Y. 245, 248, 160 N. E.
359, 361 (1928).
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